Introduction
A basic premise of libertarianism (Cwhn, 1979, De Jasay, 1985 Jasay, ,1997 Friedman, 1980 , Hoppe, 1989 Hummel, 1990; Kinsella, 1996~ Moniss, 1998 Rothbard, 1978 Rothbard, , 1998 Skoble, 1995; Sechrest, 1999; Stringham, 1998 Stringham, '1999 Tinsley, 1998 Tinsley, '1999 is that there are no positive obligations. No one is f o r d to contribute to charity. Good Samaritan laws mandating that people come to the aid of those in trouble (say, an unconscious person) are incompatible with liberhmmm . . To take an extreme case, there would be no law against refusing to toss a life preserver to a drowning man even if one could do so with minimal effort, and his death would oocur otherwise. In this political philosophy, there are only negative obligations[ll It is prohibited, and a punishable aiminal offense, to initiate or even threaten violence against anyone or his justly acquired property.
As such, libertarianism is a deontological theory of law. Proper legal enactments are thase that support this basic premise (e.g. prohibitions of murder, mpe, ththeft, fraud, etc.) and improper ones are those in conflict with it (eg. Good Samaritan laws, seat belt requirements, mandates that the rich be forced to help the poor through programs such as Aid to Dependant Children, welfare, subsidies to the poverty stricken, etc).
USE
even those explicitly utilitarian. How can it be argued that the libertarian non
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aggression axiom will help people, when the paradigm cases (allowing people to drown, not helping an unconscious man) appear to move in precisely the opposite direction? We rely upon two things. First, the invisible hand insight of Adam Smith (17764965) that self interest, not public spiritedness, best
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promotes the common weal. And second, the fact that there are no legitimate interpersonal comparisons of utility on the basis of which one could scientifically conclude even that the interest of the drowning man in staying alive is more important than that of the passerby who refuses to spend but a moment on saving him (Rothbard, 1977) . The purpose of the present paper is to test this premise of no positive obligations against a challenging critique that can be made of i t To wit, abandonment of babies. That is, does the mother who abandons her baby have the positive obligation to at least place it "on the church steps", e.g. n o w all other potential care givers of the fact that unless one of them comes forward with an offer to take in the infant, it will die? Lf so, then there is at least one positive obligation in the l i -philosophy; if not, then, at least at the outset, the libertarian claim to be generally utilitarian must be greatly attenuated. At best, there would now be an exception to the previously impermeable principle of no positive obligations; at worst, one exception tends to leads another, posing the risk that the premise will be fatally compromised, which can undermine the entire philosophical edifice
Property rights
In order to analyze the case of the mother abandoning her infant, we must hark back to the issue of property (for in the libertarh view babies are but a form of property)[2l, how it gets to be owned in the first place, how it can be transfared, and how it can be abandoned. That is, since libertarianism defends "justly acquired property", not any old property rights, if we are to be thorough we must first delve into the theory of how man attains property in the first place We will trace down the implications of property theory for children's rights in general, and then apply these to the question of abandoning children without notification.
The proper premise, we contend, is based on the Mean-RothbardianHoppean (see Locke, 1955 Locke, ,1960 Rothbard, 1998, pp. 51-76; Hoppe, 1989 Hoppe, ,1993 labor theory[3] of acquisition. Land, to start with the most basic element of non human property, is justly won by mixing one's labor with it: fafining it, cutting logs on it, clearing away debris, putting in improvements such as paths, lighting, fences, etc It is by imprinting one's personality on the land, in effect, that we come to own it; we do this though "blood, sweat and tears", sometimes, but mainly the middle mentioned bodily s e t i o n just mentioned.
There are of course questions about' the precise meaning of "mixing your labor with the land". How intensive does the farming have to be? One plant every square foot, yard, meter, acre, mile? How many crops must be planted Children's rights before ownership obtains? The answer that emanates from this perspective is Whatever is the usual practice in land of that sort. For example, in the relatively irrigated land east of the Mississippi, the farming must be more intensive; in the more arid land west of this river, less intensive. As to how long the homesteading process must take before full property rights are vested, this, too, is a social and cultural matter. 277 A similar process occurs with regard to people's ownership of themselves, of their own bodies as it were. In early baby hood, before mnsciousness arrives, we can hardly be said to own ourselves in any meaningful way; d y , we have not yet "homesteaded" ourselves. But at around age two, and increasingly as time goes on, the baby gets a sense of its ownership over itself. It asserts this by, for example, refusing to be any longer kissed by loving parents whenever the latter wish to do ~4 4 1 Yes, the homesteading justification for property ownership is not an apodictic airtight one. It is forced to rely upon local practice, the rulings of judges, etc, to buttress itself as to these specific details. In like manner, its answer to the question of how one comes to own virgin land whose main value lies in mntemplation of it as is, m o t be accorded synthetic a priori status. For example, how does N i Falls pass from unowned to owned status? Any attempt to "mix one's labor" with it would decrease its valu451 The answer is that the owner would place paths around it, enabling tourists and those who appreciate the beauties of nature to better enjoy this amenity. The thing itself remains unchanged, but, through the actions of the homesteader, he and perhaps more people are now able to enjoy it.
But if homesteading theory is not without its slight deviation from absolute perfection, these are as nothing mmpared to the alternatives to i t Rothbard (1978, p. 34) explains:
If the land is to be used at all as a resource in any sort of efficient manner, it must be owned or controlled by someone or some group, as we are.. . faced with.. . three alternatives: either the land belongs to the first user, the man who first brings it into production; or it belongs to a group cd 0th-or it belongs to the world as a whole, with every individual owning a quota1 partofwayacreofland.
The second alternative may be dismissed out of hand: why should a group of "others" have any rights to the land brought into an economic relation by the first user of it? Be these others the state, or passers by, or random thugs, the argument in behalf of their ownership of the land in question is clearly inferior to that of its first possessor. And, as to the third alternative, if there are six billion people, we would then each own one six billionth of every acre on earth.
But this is nothing short of a recipe for absolute disaster, ending in the virtual starvation of everyone. Nothing could be done with any land, for it would be "difficult" in the extreme, to get six billion owners to agree to anything. The holdout problems, for one thing, would be insurmountable[6I. Rothbard (1978, p. 35) There is actually a fourth possibity, in addition to the first three categories mentioned by Rothbard. That is, rather than one, the homesteader owning the land, or two, other people, people other than the homesteader controlling it, or, even, three, that all of us possessing evesything communally, there is the scenario where no one is able to attain it, thanks to the action of what we will now call the "forestaller".
Suppose that a person does not homestead a stretch of land but instead places a fence around i t In this scenario we stipulate that he "mixes his labor" only with that narrow strip of land upon which the fence rests, but to a sufficient degree in order to come to own it What he has done, then, is to take possession of a narrow perimeter of land, surrounding property which he does not own, nor claim. In other words, he homesteads a very thin donut shaped parcel of land, which encircles property he neither owns nor claims. It is the contention of the present p a p that this is not a legitimate homesteading scenario. The whole purpose of homesteading is to bring hitherto unowned virgin tenitory into private property ownership. A circle appearing on a globe divides the latter into not one but two parcels of land: that lying inside of the donut shaped area, and that lying outside of i t In the present case, we are assuming a paimeter that surrounds an area of one square mile. This would mean that the fenced land divides the earth into two parts, one, this square mile, and the other, the entire remainder of the earth's surface, a@& from this d one little area As far as homesteading theory is conmed, the person who owns the donut shaped area has as much claim to the land on the one side of it as the other namely, none at all. He has no claim to the land lying inside or outside of his fenced parcel, since, by stipulation, he did not mix his labor with any of i t One implication of the foregoing is that the donut owner cannot prevent others from crossing his property (in order to have access to the land he is in effect blockading). That is, under the donut configuration assumption, even though the owner has duly homesteaded every square inch of his holdings, he still cannot claim full ownership to it in its entirety, for him to be able to do so would imply that the land lying inside (or outside!) of this area can forever remain unowned. Just as physical reality abhors a vacuum, so to does l i * homesteading theory abhor land which cannot claimed nor owned because of the land owners hi^ ~attern of the forestaller. This means that the owner of the donut shaped land -tallow people at least a p t h across it so as to be able to homestead, on their own account, land that the forestaller has left unoccupied and unown@q But does the owner of the donut shaped area have to notify others of the fact Children's rights that there is a parcel of unowned land lying right in the middle of his own holdings? No. For to place this requirement upon the donut shaped land owner would be to impose upon him a positive obligation, and this, as libertarians, we are prohibited from doing.
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Abandonment Let us take another crack at this donut shaped land scenario from a somewhat different perspective. This time, we will assume not that the owner homesteads only a donut shaped parcel, surrounding unowned land, but rather, say, a solid holdmg of five square miles. Now, however, he wishes to abandon an interior area of one square mile, and to retain ownership rights over only the remaining donut shaped parcel. As we have win from the previous analysis, he must now allow access througM8] the land he still owns; this follows from the fact that he has abandoned the central piece of his land, and if this is truly to be abandoned, it must now be homesteadable. If it is not, this violates the libertarian axiom to the effect that all land must in principle be available for ownership. Nor can the non owner be prevented from reaching ownership status through forestalling.
But this interior piece of land can only be homesteadable if the owner of the donut shaped parcel allows other would be owners of his abandoned land access to this interior territory. If he does not allow them this access, he is guilty of the crime of forestalling.
What about notification? Must the man who wishes to abandon the interior portion of his land nohfy others of his act? Yes. And this follows not from any positive obligation whatsoever, but rather from the logical implication of what it means to abandon something. You cannot (logically) abandon something if you do not notify others of its availability for their own ownershid91. At most, if yo u do not undertake any notification, you have not abandoned it, but rather are simply the absentee owner over i t Suppose you leave your old sweater in your closet You never wear it any more. But you do not give it to the local Good Will organization, nor do you sell it, nor do you do anything with it except possibly amtemplate it from time to time. Have you (truly) abandoned it? You have not Instead, you are still the owner of it, and are (temporarily, for the moment, even for the rest of your life) not using it any more. You have, in a word, not yet succeeded in abandoning i t In other words, abandoning property is not something you can attain merely by wishing for it[lOl merely by no longer using it; merely by no longer exercising the tradition ownership rights over it. No. In order to s u d in fully or truly abandoning your property, you must take two steps: h t , you must notify others that you have indeed abandoned your property, and second, you must not set up roadblocks preventing others from homesteading your now abandoned property. Lf you do not a m r d your actions with both of these requirementi, it cannot be said of you that you have successfully engaged in an abandonment of your property.
USE
The whole point of the exercise is to get virgin territory into the hands of
31,3
people so that it can be used The latter is ever so much more important than the former, so much so that as long a the former does not undermine the l a t t d l l l it is no exaggeration to say that it almost doesn't matter how this is acmmplished, as long as it is accomplished 280
Abandoning land or goods without telling anyone about it is thus an undermining of this goal. For what is the point of having a theory of the process of converting unowned into owned property if it can all be made null and void through a choice such as abandonment. Therefore, just as forestalling is illegitimate since it undermines the process, so does this apply to abandoning property without notification. T h i s is not a positive obligation. Rather, it is part and parcel of the rightdresponsibilities of owning property in the h t place. Just as the owner of the land donut has to allow physical egress through what would otherwise be considered his property since he would otherwise be engaged in land forestalling, so must he allow "mental egress" through the miasma of lack of information (e.g. he must notify someone (e.g. a land registry, title search (see Rothbard, 1998, p. 65) company) that he is abandoning land).
Babies
With this introduction, we are now ready to focus on the proper libertarian relationship between babies and parents. In effect, the mother "homesteadsn the baby within her body, with a little initial help from the fathdl2) Babies, of course, cannot be owned in the same manner as applies to land, or to domesticated animals. Instead, what can be "ownedn is merely the right to continue to homestead the baby, e.g. feed and care for it and raise iQ131 States Rothbard (1998) in this regard:
. . . the parents -or rather the mother, who is the only cPrtain and visible parent -as the creators of the baby beame its owners A newborn baby cannot be an existent selfawner in any sense. Therefore, either the mother or some other party or parties may be the baby's owner, but to as& that a third party can claim his 'ownershipw over the baby would give that person the right to seize the baby by force from its nahual or "homesteading" owner, its mother.
Suppose, now, that the mother, or both parents, wish to abandon their baby[l4)
Several options are open to them, a>nsistent with libertarian theory[l5) For one thing, they can give their child up for adoption. They can do so for no financial compensation, or for pecuniary gain (Landes and Posner, 1978) . But since they cannot give up more with regard to the baby than they did in fact own, it would be illegitimate for the new parents to mistreat the baby; had the original parents done so, they would have last the rights to continue parenting it. For the only way to attain homestead rights to the child after giving b i to it is to bring it up in a reasonable manner. Were the parents to instead abuse their child, this would not at all be compatible with homesteading i t If so, they would lose all rights to continue to keep the child Here, it might be thought there is another disanalogy between homesteading Children's rights land, or animals on the one hand, and children on the other. In the former cases, it might be argued, one can attain ownership through abuse, or by decreasing the value of it. That is, a man may come to own a deer by killing it, or a tract of land by burning down all of the trees on it. And, to some people, a live animal is worth more than a dead one, and wooded acreage more than the denuded version. But a basic premise of Austrian subjectivist economics (Barnett, 1989;  . 281 Buchanan and Thirlby, 1981; Buchanan, 1969; von Mises, 1966; Rothbard, 1993) is that man acts so as to substitute a more preferred state of affairs for a less satisfactory one. If he burns woods, and kills a deer, we have no warrant to interpret this as anything but an improvement, despite the possible evaluations to the contrary of an outside observer. For another thing, they could abandon the baby without choosing adoptive parents. That is, as long as they notify all and sundry of their intention to give up their rights to the baby, and do not prevent anyone else from homesteading the child, they have no positive obligation to keep it, or even to ensure that the baby is taken up by others. Would it ever be possible, under libertarian law, for a baby to be abandoned by its parents, for there to be no other adult willing to care and feed it, and the baby be relegated to death? Yes. However, this could occur only under the condition where the entire world in effect was notified of this homesteading opportunity, no roadblocks were placed against new adoptive parents taking over, but not a single solitary adult stepped forward to take on this responsibility[l61 Since there are no positive obligations in the libertarian lexicon[l7J it is logically possible for such a sad state of events to take place[l81
We now arrive at more intellectually challenging scenarios. First, suppose that the parents are willing to notify others of their impending abandonment of their baby, but set up roadblocks against anyone else talung over care of it. For example, they announce to the world that they are trying to set up a redudio to embarrass the libertarian philosophy. To this end they are going to leave the baby in his crib, and not feed or diaper bin To those who wish to adopt this baby they say: T h e baby is in his crib. The crib is in our house. This house is private property: you cannot have access to it". Picture hundreds of would be caretakers surrounding these parent's house, all of them willing to adopt the baby, but she insists, based upon her property rights in this dwelling, that all of them stay out while the baby dies of stanation.
Does this reductio sud Not at all. Apart from the pragmatic fact that most others in society would severely boycott such a couple, there is the point that they would be guilty of forestalling the homesteading of property (eg. the baby) which is no longer owned. This would be in direct and blatant contradiction to the libertarian homesteading theory which oversees the USE bringing in to ownership of virgin territory, not the shielding of it from those 31,3 who wish to homestead it.
Ordinarily, in the case of forestalling new ownership of land which has been abandoned, not allowing newcomers a m to one's own property (the donut) for this purpose would be equivalent to land theft, and punished accordingly.
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But in the present case what is being shielded from homesteading is not land, but rather a baby. This would be equivalent to murder, and those responsible for be treated very severely[l91 Second, take the case where the parents who are abandoning the baby place no physical barriers against the entry of would be homesteaders of it to their home, but instead fail to notify anyone of their intention. Again, a similar result applies: the parents are guilty of murder. Their position is an intellectually incoherent one[2a They claim to be abandoning the baby, but, as we have seen from the case of the sweater considered above, they have succeeded in doing no such thing. Rather, they are in a situation with regard to the baby where it is still in their care, but they are not caring for it. That is the paradigm case of child abuse, a serious crime indeed, and if it persists until the death of the child they are guilty of murder also.
In order to be thorough and exhaustive, we may briefly mention the third option, where these "parentsn both fail to n o t e of their baby abandonment, and also attempt to physically prevent others from taking over this job. Since either of these actions on its own would merit severe penalties, this would surely apply to the combination of both of them
Conclusion
The libertarian argument is that baby abandoners do not have a positive obligation to n o w others of their act; rather, this stems from what it means to abandon property, any property. The essence of the libertarian rejection of the redwtio, when applied to physical property, is as follows: If you have a sweater in your closet, even one you don't use any more, you haven't abandoned i t If you have abandoned it, really abandoned it (are not just an absentee owner, or a stock piler, or a pack rat) then you have to (you are compelled by the laws of logic to):
notify someone who will spread the word about this; and refrain from preveating others from homesteading it (e.g. setting up a blockade against their doing so).
